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ABSTRACT
As a major player in world trade, the euro area 
is strongly influenced by globalisation, but is 
far from being a passive spectator. The paper 
analyses how the euro area’s trade specialization 
has changed in response to stronger international 
competition and the emergence of new global 
players, evaluating results and possible 
challenges ahead. The message remains mixed. 
On the positive side, the export specialisation 
of the euro area is increasing in some medium-
high or high-tech sectors where productivity 
growth is strong and demand robust, such as 
pharmaceuticals, also by a more intensive 
recourse to importing intermediate goods from 
low-cost countries. On the other hand, in 
comparison   to other industrialised economies, 
the euro area has been somewhat slower in 
moving towards research-intensive goods and 
away from labour-intensive sectors. While this 
could reflect data classification issues, it may 
also be a sign of structural rigidities in the euro 
area, which hinder adjustment processes.  5
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE MAIN 
CONCLUSIONS1
Globalisation is not a new phenomenon, but 
there is growing consensus that its impact is 
fundamentally changing world patterns of 
production and trade. For the euro area,2 a very 
open economic area with a strong manufacturing 
orientation, such developments obviously have 
a critical relevance. What aspects of globalisation 
are the most important for the euro area as a 
major player in world trade? What are the main 
channels through which the globalisation 
process is exerting its effects? How is the euro 
area adjusting to this, overall? These are the 
main issues we aim to address in this paper. 
Recent changes in euro area trade are analysed 
against the background of comparative 
advantages as well as in comparison with other 
large economies. The ultimate objective is to 
assess how the euro area’s trade patterns have 
changed in response to stronger competition 
and to other recent changes in the economic 
environment, drawing conclusions on the 
possible direction that further adjustments may 
take (and paying due attention to classification 
issues related to the indicators used).
Section 1 discusses predictions based on trade 
theories as to the trade effects of globalisation 
and provides the conceptual framework. It also 
lays out the set of complementary trade 
indicators that we consider to analyse recent 
changes in euro area trade. Section II looks 
at the euro area’s export performance at the 
aggregate and sectoral level. It aims to determine 
where the euro area’s specialisation lies and 
how this has changed in recent years. The 
analysis assesses factor and technology intensity 
of exports, looks at how dynamic destination 
markets are and establishes a connection 
between trade and sectoral productivity. 
Section III looks at euro area import penetration; 
a special emphasis is given to intermediate 
imports, used as a proxy for the increasing 
fragmentation of production across countries. 
The intermediate imports data are then used to 
create alternative measures of sectoral 
specialisation net of imports. Changes in 
intermediate imports are also related to sectoral 
value added shares in order to tentatively assess 
whether the location abroad of some production 
stages is consistent with an increase in value 
added across sectors as available resources are 
used more effectively. Finally, Section IV 
summarises the main findings of the paper and 
discusses the outlook for euro area trade in the 
light of an increasingly integrated and globally 
competitive external environment. 
The main result of the paper is that substantial 
adjustments have been taking place in euro area 
trade, which could reflect globalisation among 
other things. In particular, on the positive side, 
(i) the export specialisation of the euro area is 
increasing in some medium-high or high-tech 
sectors where productivity growth is strong and 
demand robust, such as pharmaceuticals, while 
declining in lower-tech sectors, such as textiles 
and (ii) the euro area appears to increasingly 
import intermediate goods from low-cost 
countries, in order to lower production costs 
and perhaps to focus on the higher value-added 
stages of the production chain.  
Nevertheless, there are also signs that further 
adjustments may still be needed. The first is 
that the euro area still has a higher specialisation 
in relative terms than other major industrialised 
countries – including the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Japan – in predominantly 
labour-intensive categories of goods. Moreover, 
despite the closer integration of emerging 
markets’ labour pools into the world economy, 
the euro area has not become less specialised 
in exporting labour-intensive goods, even 
when accounting for intermediate imports. 
While this could reflect the predominant use of 
relatively highly-skilled labour or an effective 
1  We are grateful for the contributions from D. Taglioni (Sections I 
and III), C. Hornok (Boxes 4 and 5) and K. Benkovskis (Section 
II.1). Excellent research assistance was provided by N. Queiros 
de Faria and R. Pereira. Moreover, the paper draws on some 
previous internal work by S. Cabral and M. Bussière and has 
greatly benefited from comments by R. Anderton, H. J. Klöckers, 
D. Taglioni and by an anonymous internal referee. 
2  Throughout the entire paper we refer to the euro area excluding 
Slovenia due to the period covered by the analysis, which ends 
before the adoption of the euro by this country.
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use by multinational companies of labour 
supplied abroad, it may also be a sign of 
relatively protected product and labour markets, 
which could have sheltered the manufacturing 
sectors from competitive pressures, thus 
delaying adjustment processes. In comparison 
with the euro area, the United States appears to 
be moving more decisively towards research-
intensive products, while retreating from 
labour-intensive and raw materials-intensive 
products. Second, there is evidence that the 
euro area is losing ground in one of its 
traditionally strong sectors – machinery and 
equipment – since higher intermediate imports 
are associated with stagnant exports, which 
could be a sign of deindustrialisation in this 
field. This is corroborated by the strong rise in 
imports of capital goods (particularly machinery 
and transport equipment) from the new EU 
Member States,3 which appears to be in part 
displacing intra-euro area imports.  
3  Throughout the entire paper we refer to the new EU Member 
States excluding Bulgaria and Romania as the analysis was 
undertaken while these countries were not yet members of the 
EU. 7
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1 GLOBALISATION  AND  TRADE:  THE 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 RECENT  TRENDS
Globalisation is a catchword for the growing 
interdependence of economies via an increase 
in cross-border transactions in goods and 
services, natural resources, capital and labour. 
In the past decade the process of globalisation 
has accelerated as the use of ever more 
sophisticated information and communication 
technology has grown exponentially, while a 
breakthrough in connectivity, partly via the 
internet, has reduced the costs of transporting 
goods and information across the globe.4
This technological empowerment across the 
world has been accompanied by a strong rise in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (see Chart 1). 
This has led to new ways of doing business: 
production processes have become increasingly 
internationalised as companies have established 
affiliates abroad to gain access to foreign 
markets and reduce input costs, while supply-
chains have been set up on a global scale as a 
way of gaining a competitive edge.  
Globalisation has also allowed emerging 
countries to enter and compete in world markets. 
The growing integration into world trade of 
emerging Asia, as well as that of central and 
eastern European countries (CEECs) following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (see Chart 2), 
has led to a sharpening in the competitive 
environment and to large changes in the 
structure of global trade.
Over time, globalisation means that national 
boundaries for goods, services and production 
factors are becoming less important in economic 
terms. This, in turn, implies that overall welfare 
gains are being realised as the world’s scarce 
resources are reallocated into the most 
productive activities across the world.  For the 
euro area – a large and relatively open economy 
– the benefits are likely to be significant, since 
closer trade integration worldwide, by leading 
to higher world trade, will increase demand for 
euro area goods. Moreover – all else being 
equal – stronger international competition 
should bring about lower costs for firms and 
lower prices of traded goods for consumers in 
the euro area, increase the availability of new 
product varieties, induce technology and 
knowledge transfers, as well as increase 
4  For a more detailed description of how the current era of 
globalisation is different from previous such eras, see for 
instance Bourguignon et al (2002) or Bernanke (2006).
Chart 2 Integration of China and the CEECs 
into world trade
(Exports+imports by country/region divided by world 
exports+imports, in percentages)
Sources: CHELEM and ECB calculations.
Note: Trade flows are in values and include only goods.
China
CEECs





















Chart 1 World imports and the global stock 
of inward and outward FDI as a proportion 
of world GDP
(percentages of GDP)
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
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productivity and economic growth. These 
benefits notwithstanding, market forces will 
trigger large changes in the structure of trade 
and the economy in line with comparative 
advantages, thus altering the relative returns on 
capital and labour.5  
1.2 CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK
What can trade theory tell us about the likely 
direction of adjustments in trade patterns 
following the structural shift induced by 
globalisation? The world of today consists of 
very complex trade relationships between a 
growing number of countries and it is 
characterised by an increasing number of goods, 
services and production tasks, which altogether, 
simple models of trade cannot fully capture. 
Nevertheless, such models are still informative 
and provide important yet – given the different 
assumptions on which they are based – different 
predictions as to how globalisation will affect 
world trade structures. A brief summary is 
provided below. 
To start with, traditional trade theories that 
assume perfectly competitive markets and are 
aimed at explaining inter-industry trade – see 
Ohlin (1933) and Ricardo (1963) or Krugman 
and Obstfeld (2003) for a summary – suggest 
that countries engage in trade according to their 
comparative advantages. These are determined 
by the relative availability of factors of 
production as well as differences in productivity. 
Chart 3 Physical capital/labour ratios across 
countries
(Index, US = 100, 1999)
Sources: World Bank (Sandeep Mahajan (PRMEP) 2002) and 
ECB calculations.
Note: “Other e. Asia” stands for ”other emerging Asia”. For the 
definition of country groups see Table A1 in Annex A. Prices 




























5  See for instance Bernanke (2006).
Table 1 R&D intensity 
(percentages of GDP, 2003)
Sources: OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 
2005, except EU25 and euro area (Eurostat, structural indicators 
database).
1) Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a percentage of GDP.
  R&D intensity1)
EU25 1.9
euro area  1.9
France 2.2
Germany 2.6
Italy (2002)  1.2
United Kingdom  1.9
United States  2.6
Japan 3.2





Chart 4 Physical capital/labour ratios for 
the world1 before and after trade 
integration
(Index: world before trade integration = 100; 1999)
Sources: World Bank (Sandeep Mahajan (PRMEP) 2002) and 
ECB calculations.
Note: Prices and exchange rates for 1987.
1) World before trade integration is proxied by the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the euro area and Japan. The world 
after trade integration additionally includes China, other 
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A country would thus optimally specialise in 
the production of those products that use the 
abundant productive resources more intensively. 
Despite notorious difficulties in actually 
measuring factor endowments, available 
evidence confirms that capital/labour ratios are 
much lower in emerging, low-wage economies 
than in developed, high-income countries, 
particularly Japan and the United States (see 
Chart 3). Differences in the intensity of research 
and development (R&D) are also large across 
countries, with intensity relatively high in Japan 
and the United States, somewhat lower in the 
euro area and significantly lower in China and 
some of the CEECs (see Table 1). This would 
support the idea that, a priori, developed 
economies have a comparative advantage in 
the production and export of capital-intensive 
and research-intensive goods, whereas the 
comparative advantage of emerging economies 
is more likely to lie in the production and export 
of labour-intensive goods. 
These traditional trade theories and the trade 
patterns that follow from them suggest that the 
integration of new players – such as China, the 
CEECs and India – into world trade leads to a 
further sharpening of these comparative 
advantages across countries. Chart 4 illustrates 
the reason for this. An initial situation without 
the fast-growing emerging countries is assumed 
and the world capital/labour ratio is indexed 
to 100.6 When these new players are integrated, 
the capital/labour ratio of the world drops 
to around a third of its starting level, since 
these countries are heavily labour-abundant. 
This would mean strong market pressure for 
developed economies to shift their production 
and export structures towards more capital-
intensive goods. 
Other trade theories, however, lead to different 
conclusions about the impact of globalisation 
on trade. The new trade theories (developed 
mainly to explain the existence of extensive 
intra-industry trade among developed 
economies) replace the assumption of perfect 
competition on product markets with the one 
of monopolistic competition, and introduce 
product differentiation, scale economies and 
utility functions including preference for 
variety.7 These theories describe well the 
existence of intra-industry trade flows between 
trade partners with similar factor intensities 
and comparative advantages. Hence they are 
consistent with the view that more open global 
markets would ultimately lead to a fall in cross-
country industrial specialisation. This clearly 
holds provided that openness leads to a 
convergence of international factor intensities 
and incomes – as assumed by standard trade 
and growth theories.8
The literature on the new economic geography, 
by contrast, suggests that industrial activities 
concentrate in certain countries or regions, 
determined by the availability of skilled labour 
pools, specialised suppliers and knowledge 
externalities.9 In these theories, specialisation 
across countries is thus motivated not only by 
factor proportions but also by externalities and 
spillovers that lead to self-reinforcing equilibria 
in agglomerated industry clusters.10 Predictions 
of trade flows arising from the theory of 
economic geography are, however, ambiguous, 
since they mostly depend on historical 
“accidents”. Furthermore, agglomeration also 
creates congestion costs, offsetting some of the 
positive effects.  
Recent evidence (Schott, 2004; Fontagné et al., 
2006) suggests that capital and skill-intensive 
countries use their endowment advantage over 
low-wage countries to produce “vertically 
superior” varieties of a good. These are varieties 
6  Capital-labour ratios are estimated for two sets of country 
groups: the first (defined as “world prior to trade integration”) 
includes the United States, the United Kingdom, the euro area 
and Japan, and the second (defined as “world after trade 
integration”) additionally includes China, the “other emerging 
Asia” countries and Hungary. The ratios are calculated using 
World Bank data from Sandeep Mahajan (PRMEP, 2002).
7  An example is the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz utility function, see 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976). 
8  See for instance Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Kierzkowski 
(1984).
9  See for instance Krugman (1991), Fujita et al (1999) and Porter 
(1990).
10 The theories of trade and economic geography seem to be 
relevant in explaining some of the specialisations in industries 
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that are relatively capital or skill-intensive and 
possess added features or higher quality, thereby 
leading to high value added return by 
commanding high prices. This evidence would 
suggest that conventional tests of trade theory 
using industry-level data are problematic 
because much of the endowment-driven 
specialisation might still take place, but at a 
level that was – until recently – hidden to the 
researcher. It would partly explain why 
developed economies – and most notably the 
euro area – continue to produce and export in 
industries, such as apparel and textiles, which 
are commonly associated with developing 
countries, and why they do so even in those 
instances where protection and market 
segmentation do not fully motivate the choice 
of foreign consumers to pay a premium for the 
higher priced labour-intensive goods produced 
there.
In an attempt to solve some of the puzzles of 
recent trends in international trade, Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) focus their analysis 
on a growing feature of globalisation – the 
increasing fragmentation of production across 
countries. Their models have two main 
implications. First, while specialisation may 
still be in line with factor endowments, it will 
apply not only to final goods but also to 
individual production tasks. For example, 
regardless of the nature of the final product, 
labour-intensive tasks or stages of the production 
process will tend to be relocated to labour-
abundant countries. Developed economies will 
be more likely instead to focus on the upper 
stages of the value chain (e.g. research, 
development, planning and design, the 
production of skill and technology-intensive 
parts and the marketing of products). The 
second implication is that, because of the 
critical role of multinational companies in the 
global economy, the concepts of national 
boundaries and geographical specialisation 
across countries is becoming less meaningful. 
As multinational companies take advantage of 
differences in endowments, factor costs, skills 
and technology across countries, emerging 
economies can through them gain easy access 
to otherwise unavailable technologies. As a 
result, emerging economies could experience 
large increases in productivity as they quickly 
move up the technological ladder, possibly 
leading to a specialisation in high-tech (final or 
intermediate) goods. Similarly, industrialised 
economies, by making use of the abundant 
labour in developing countries via production 
or task off-shoring, may ultimately increase 
their specialisation in labour-intensive products 
while reducing the domestic labour devoted 
to it.
The main conclusion of the above discussion is 
that even theoretically, there is no single 
benchmark against which to assess the way 
global trade patterns will move in the light of 
globalisation pressures. This is because a 
number of forces tend to pull in different 
directions than a simple comparative advantage 
model would have predicted. As the overall 
results of these forces are indeterminate, and 
theory on the issue is still nascent, the question 
of the direction in which trade patterns are 
changing, which is the focus of the rest of this 
paper, is essentially an empirical one. A 
corollary to this discussion is that changes in 
market shares and in countries’ trade 
specialisations might not be a clear and fully 
satisfactory signal of the underlying national 
competitiveness. 
1.3  HOW DO WE MEASURE ADJUSTMENTS 
IN EURO AREA TRADE IN A GLOBALISED 
WORLD?
In line with the above discussion, traditional 
indicators of trade performance used by the 
applied trade literature need to be cautiously 
interpreted in the light of trade globalisation. 
The overriding reason for this is that 
globalisation triggers substantial structural 
changes in production and trade specialisation, 
which may either not be captured by standard 
indicators or make their interpretation difficult. 
A loss in export market share, for instance, 
might well be expected if new trade players are 
entering the field. And, more generally, there 
may even be circumstances in which such a loss 11
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can actually be seen as a positive development, 
as it could in fact allow developed economies to 
reorient their production and exports towards 
goods with higher value added content.  
Trade theory would suggest that, ultimately, 
any change in the structure of euro area trade 
should be evaluated against the long-term 
welfare gains that it provides, thus whether it 
leads to an increase in current and future per 
capita income, wealth and productivity. Since, 
however, a satisfactory measure of welfare is 
difficult to attain in practice, the strategy we 
adopt here is to rely on a set of indicators – 
rather than on a single measure – to assess the 
extent and nature of aggregate structural 
changes that are taking place now and are likely 
in the future. We are interested in gauging the 
direction in which the euro area is adjusting to 
the competitive challenges posed by the changes 
in world demand and relative prices caused by 
the emergence of new global players and to 
other changes in the economy. Moreover, we 
analyse how quickly these adjustments are 
taking place, as a quick adjustment would 
minimise the losses that occur in the transition 
period as a result of resources being locked into 
inefficient uses. 
We will use five main indicators. The first 
indicator is the realised specialisation of exports 
by factor intensity, which we employ with the 
aim of verifying whether changes in trade 
specialisation are in line with notional 
comparative advantages. While indicators of 
specialisation are largely ex post measures of 
trade performance, reflecting past decisions by 
firms regarding the sectoral/geographical 
markets on which to focus, changes over time 
in these measures can give some indication as 
to how the euro area export sector has readjusted 
in recent years in comparison with other 
economies.  
Second, we look at how the trade specialisation 
across countries compares with the composition 
and dynamics of world import demand.  Is the 
euro area specialising in sectors which are the 
world’s most dynamic and/or least volatile?  Is 
there evidence that emerging markets are 
becoming stronger competitors in the most 
dynamic sectors of world demand, leading to 
potentially lower profit margins in those 
sectors?
The third indicator we use is sectoral 
productivity. In the long run, exports are likely 
to increase in the sectors where productivity is 
highest, as the most efficient producers tend 
to participate in highly competitive export 
markets. Against this background, we also look 
at whether strong and rising trade specialisations 
are paralleled by high sectoral productivity 
growth across sectors and relative to other 
developed economies.
The fourth set of indicators addresses the issue 
of international production sharing and focuses 
on export indicators, net of imports. While our 
approach is similar to the standard Lafay index11  
(an indicator of revealed comparative advantage 
that nets out imports from exports at the sectoral 
level), we focus on intermediate imports, which 
are likely to better capture – although this is not 
free from caveats – international production 
sharing for a particular good. The comparison 
of trade specialisation based solely on exports 
with that based on exports net of intermediate 
imports sheds light on some aspects of 
international production sharing, including its 
impact on trade structures across countries.  
Finally, we look at whether, across sectors, 
increased sourcing of intermediate inputs 
from low-wage countries is associated with 
increasing value added. While a more rigorous 
econometric analysis would be required to 
obtain solid conclusions, we provide some 
tentative evidence on whether changes in the 
sourcing of inputs is allowing euro area firms 
to concentrate on stages of the production chain 
where value added is higher.
11  See Lafay (1992). The standard Lafay index is often used in the 
applied trade literature, see European Commission (2005), and 
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2 DEVELOPMENTS  IN  EURO  AREA  EXPORTS
2.1  STRUCTURAL VERSUS CYCLICAL CHANGES IN 
GLOBAL TRADE PATTERNS
The extent to which export developments are 
affected by structural factors such as 
globalisation is evident from basic broad 
indicators of trade performance, i.e. export 
market shares and export price competitiveness 
(Charts 5 and 6). Two features stand out. First, 
as expected, against the background of new 
low-income global trade players entering the 
field, export market shares of the incumbent 
countries have fallen in recent years, while 
that of China, for instance, has dramatically 
increased (Chart 5). 
For the euro area – and the United Kingdom – 
this loss has been relatively contained and 
mostly concentrated in the last few years in 
conjunction with the appreciation of the euro. 
In contrast, the United States and Japan 
experienced a sharp loss in market share 
between 1998 and 2002-03. More recently, 
Japan’s market share has recovered and that 
of the United States stabilised, which could 
suggest that the structural adjustment to global 
trade integration is taking place across countries 
and regions at different points in time and over 
different horizons.
A second feature, strongly related to the 
previous point, is that diverging trends in export 
market shares are hardly in line with movements 
in relative export prices,12 except for the euro 
area (for a discussion of export market shares 
and export price competitiveness across 
individual euro area countries, see Box 1). 
Chart 6 shows developed economies’ export 
market shares in relation to export price 
competitiveness, defined as the export prices 
of a country’s competitors over the prices 
of the country’s own exports (an increase in 
the index therefore signals an improvement 
in competitiveness). The most striking 
developments occurred in Japan, which suffered 
considerable export market share losses in spite 
of strong gains in price competitiveness. This 
reflects a shift of part of Japan’s production 
facilities abroad, which has meant the use of 
neighbouring countries as export platforms.13 
In the United States, the improvement in price 
competitiveness since 2002 has led only to 
some stabilisation in the export market share, 
while in the United Kingdom, relative export 
prices have improved since 2000, but the export 
market share continued to decrease until early 
2005.
Chart 5 Export market shares
(in volumes; index: 1994 = 100; annual data)
Sources: IMF, Eurostat and ECB calculations.


























12  In this paper, we focus on relative export prices as a measure of 
price competitiveness, although there are many others, each 
having their own merits. More discussion on the relationship 
between changes in the nominal euro effective exchange rate 
and relative export prices as well as other measures of price 
competitiveness can be found in a previous Occasional Paper 
(see MPC Task force of ESCB (2005)).
13  See Abe (2003) for more detail on Japan’s trade response to the 
increasing competition from China. Moreover, OECD (2002) 
finds a large increase in Japanese intra-firm trade with the rest 
of Asia and other countries over the 1990s.13
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Box 1
EXPORT MARKET SHARES AND EXPORT PRICE COMPETITIVENESS OF EURO AREA COUNTRIES 
This box looks at export market shares in relation to their main determinant, price 
competitiveness, for the individual euro area countries.1 For the euro area in aggregate, we had 
found that the export market share was relatively stable between 1994 and 2002, while some 
market share losses occurred thereafter. This is the result of a relatively diverse performance 
across euro area countries (Chart A). While Italy has experienced significant losses since 1995, 
as – to a lesser extent – has France, most other countries have held broadly stable export market 
shares or even increased them (particularly Ireland and Germany).
Chart 6 Export price competitiveness and export market shares
(Index 1999 Q1 = 100)
Sources: Eurostat external trade statistics and national accounts, and ECB.
Note: Relative export prices equal a weighted average of competitor export prices divided by domestic export prices (an increase 
reflects a gain in price competitiveness). The real export market share is derived as the volume of exports divided by a weighted average 



























































































1  This Box draws on ECB (2006), in which the competitiveness and export performance of the euro area and of individual euro area 
countries is discussed in more detail. 
2 DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EURO AREA 
EXPORTS14
ECB 
Occasional Paper No 55
March 2007
Against this background, one tentative way of 
assessing how much of the loss in euro area 
export market share may have been a 
consequence of China having recently become 
a new major player in world trade is to simply 
subtract world imports from China from the 
euro area foreign demand indicator.14 Chart 7 
shows that this does not change the dynamics of 
the euro area export market share before 1999, 
as China’s trade growth was similar to growth 
in world trade in this period.  
However, between 1999 and 2006, which 
corresponds to the period of rapid expansion of 
China’s share in world trade, the euro area’s 
market share loss is significantly smaller 
Chart B shows the relationship between export market shares and price competitiveness (measured 
here as relative export prices) across euro area countries. Differing movments in price competitiveness 
across euro area countries need to materialise through changes in actual costs and prices, as 
adjustments in nominal exchange rates are no longer possible within the euro area.2 Focusing on the 
period since 1998, there appears to be a positive correlation between relative export prices and export 
market shares at the euro area country level. It appears that the export performance of Ireland has 
been relatively favourable given developments in relative export prices, whereas export market shares 
in France, Finland and Portugal have been lower than perhaps suggested by price developments, as 
price competitiveness has improved, but market shares have fallen nevertheless. Italy’s large loss in 
export market share seems to be closely related to the substantial fall in its export price competitiveness. 
Overall, the correlation between changes in export market share and relative export prices is not 
particularly strong, however, suggesting that other determinants, such as non-price competitiveness, 
the different sectoral specialisation across countries and the different ways of adjusting to globalisation 
also influence export market shares at the country level.
2  See ECB (2005) for a comprehensive discussion of inflation differentials within the euro area.
14  All calculations are made in constant prices from 2000.
Chart A Export market shares, selected euro 
area countries
(index: 1998 = 100; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Sources: Eurostat national accounts and ECB calculations
Note: Last observation refers to the fourth quarter of 2005.
Chart B Price competitiveness and export 
market shares across euro area countries
(annual percentage changes)
Note: The data show average annual rates of change for the 
period 1998-2005. Price competitiveness is proxied by relative 
export prices corresponding to country export prices divided by 
competitors export prices. An increase in relative export prices 
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if China is excluded. This indicates that the 
trade integration of China associated with 
globalisation may have been a prominent reason 
for the fall in the euro area export market share 
beyond export price competitiveness effects. 
2.2  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EXPORT 
SPECIALISATION
2.2.1 THE DATASET
The previous section has shown that structural 
factors, which could be associated with 
globalisation, seem to have exerted an influence 
on global trade. To further evaluate recent 
changes in the structure of euro area exports, 
we need to look at trends in sectoral 
specialisation. The aim is to compare these 
findings with respect to the trends expected on 
the basis of the standard comparative advantage 
framework outlined in Section 1, as well as with 
trends for major competitors. To do so, we use 
the CHELEM database of the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales 
(CEPII), which reports information on bilateral 
trade flows across countries for goods in 
value terms (in US dollars), broken down into 
71 sectors.   
For our purposes we use two distinct, but 
fairly complementary ways of aggregating 
and analysing the data: 
1)  a four-product group classification in 
accordance with the factor intensity of 
production; and
2)  a 17-product group classification in 
accordance with technological intensity.
The first classification is intended to broadly 
test whether specialisations are in line with 
comparative advantages based on factor 
endowments. By contrast with the standard 
theoretical framework (which examines two 
production factors) we consider four factors of 
production, i.e. (i) raw materials (including 
energy-related goods), (ii) labour, (iii) physical 
capital and (iv) research. The export flow data 
based on the initial 71 sectors are thus 
aggregated into four product groups, depending 
on which of these factors of production 
the sectors mostly use. As an example, 
fertilizers fall in the predominantly raw 
materials-intensive category, while clothing is 
categorised as predominantly labour-intensive, 
cars are predominantly capital-intensive and 
aeronautics predominantly research-intensive. 
The classification methodology follows 
(with some modification) that undertaken by 
Yilmaz (2003), which builds on Hufbauer and 
Chilas (1974), and is described in Table A3 
of Annex A.15 A caveat that applies to this 
classification is that it is largely subjective and 
that some goods can be quite difficult to classify 
as their production may use several factors to a 
similar extent. Moreover, the results may be 
misleading if, for instance, a country focuses 
on the labour-intensive production stages of a 
predominantly research-intensive good.
The second classification aggregates the 
raw data into 17 sectors according to their 
technological content, using the breakdown in 
the OECD Science, Technology and Industry 
Scoreboard 2005. The classification establishes 
the technological content by ranking the 
17 sectors by their R&D intensity, defined as 
R&D spending divided by production or value 
Chart 7 Euro area world export market 
shares, total and excluding China
















1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
15  This classification is also applied in some recent trade policy 
papers, see for instance European Commission (2005).
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added in 12 OECD countries. It is thus somewhat 
better founded than the first classification 
as it is more objective. Nevertheless, this 
classification also has caveats in that it is still 
quite broad, so that more finely disaggregated 
products or product stages within industries 
classified as high-technology may not actually 
require much R&D investment, while others 
in low-technology industries may be highly 
research-intensive. In this second breakdown, 
we exclude trade flows of energy-related 
products16 in order to avoid distortions resulting 
from the highly volatile prices of oil and other 
energy-related products.  
2.2.2 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND FACTOR 
INTENSITY
In order to assess whether the euro area17 and its 
main competitors have an export specialisation 
broadly in accordance with their relative factor 
abundance, we use the first data classification 
mentioned above – four product groups – to 
construct an index of revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA). Following Balassa (1965), 
we compute the relative export specialisation of 
individual countries across the four product 
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The numerator represents the percentage share 
of sector i in country k’s total exports, and the 
denominator corresponds to the percentage 
share of sector i in total world exports. If 
RCAk.i > 1, then country k is specialised in 
sector  i relative to the world average. The 
normalisation by the world average share of 
exports by sector controls for cyclical changes 
in the world export structure; the RCA index 
can therefore be interpreted as a structural 
index of specialisation.
The results show that over the period 1993-
2004, euro area exporters appear to have been 
specialising in predominantly capital and 
research-intensive, but also labour-intensive, 
categories of exports (see Table 2). The 
specialisation in the latter category does not 
seem to be fully in line with the capital/labour 
ratio of the euro area, which is much higher than 
in emerging economies. Partly, this reflects the 
export specialisation of some euro area countries 
in lower-tech sectors such as textiles and paper 
(for more information on the specialisation of 
individual euro area countries, see Box 3).18
By contrast, the three developed competitor 
economies considered – i.e. the United States, 
United Kingdom and Japan – have no revealed 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
16  More precisely, we exclude trade flows related to the mining of 
coal, extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, electricity, 
coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel.
17  Unless otherwise indicated, we focus on extra-euro area trade 
flows in this paper.
18  Part of the explanation could also clearly relate to the relative 
arbitrariness of the classification by factor content, including 
the inability of this approach to take into account differences in 
skill levels (which could be relatively high in the euro area).
Table 2 Revealed comparative advantage by factor intensity
 (Index¹); average 1993-2004)
Sources: CHELEM and ECB calculations.
Note: Country and product groups are defined in more detail in Tables A1 and A3 in Annex A. Sectors are aggregated according to the 
extent to which they require each of the four factors of production.
1) Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage 
Exports are predominantly  euro   United  United  Japan  China  Other  CEECs
 area  States  Kingdom      emerging
        Asia
Raw  materials-intensive  0.5 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.7 1.6
Labour-intensive  1.1 0.7 0.9 0.5 2.2 1.2 1.2
Capital-intensive  1.2 0.9 1.0 1.5 0.4 0.5 1.2
Research-intensive  1.1 1.4 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.3 0.517
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exports; they specialise in research-intensive 
products, in line with their relatively high 
R&D spending in relation to GDP. In addition 
to this, Japan is specialised in predominantly 
capital-intensive goods, reflecting its high 
capital/labour ratio as seen in Section 1.2. 
Unsurprisingly, China, but also other emerging 
Asia and the CEECs, have an export 
concentration in labour-intensive goods. The 
other emerging Asia countries are also 
specialised in research-intensive products. This 
is not the case for the CEECs, whose lack of 
revealed comparative advantage in research-
intensive goods clearly reflects their low R&D 
investment shares. The CEECs have an export 
specialisation in predominantly capital and raw 
materials-intensive goods.
Overall, the sectoral export specialisation by 
factor intensity broadly reflects the countries’ 
relative factor endowments. Most notably, on 
average, developing countries tend to specialise 
in exporting labour-intensive products, while 
capital and research-intensive exports are the 
main focus of developed economies.  
The trade integration of the emerging countries 
should a priori have led to large changes through 
time in comparative advantages and thus 
specialisation across countries in recent years. 
Chart 8 shows changes in revealed comparative 
advantages over time.
Overall, there have not been major changes in 
the specialisation in capital or labour-intensive 
goods, except for some decline in China’s and 
other emerging Asia’s specialisation in the latter 
category. It is striking, however, that the euro 
area’s specialisation in labour-intensive goods 
exports has hardly moved since 1993, remaining 
relatively high despite the closer trade 
integration of the CEECs and emerging Asia. 
Other emerging Asia has in fact become, in 
relative terms, less specialised in labour-
intensive exports than the euro area. Box 2 
argues that this could reflect product and labour 
markets in the euro area being relatively 
protected compared with other developed 
economies, which may have sheltered the 
manufacturing sectors from competitive 
pressures, thus delaying potential adjustment 
processes in industry structures.  
As for predominantly research-intensive 
products, the emerging countries seem to have 
extended their export specialisation, with a 
Chart 8 Developments in revealed comparative advantages
(index; annual data)
Sources: CHELEM and ECB calculations.
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particularly sharp increase in China (Chart 9). 
This can be explained by the rising FDI flows 
that bring the technologies of developed 
countries to emerging market locations. 
Moreover, emerging economies, which are far 
behind in terms of technology than more 
developed countries, can often imitate 
technologies that have proven successful 
elsewhere. This enables them to avoid the risks 
and costs involved in innovation of their own 
and thus to enter research-intensive product 
markets more rapidly. Japan and the United 
States have broadly retained their already strong 
positions in this type of exports. By contrast, 
the euro area has only a relatively weak 
specialisation in research-intensive products 
and has not extended this over time, while the 
UK’s specialisation in this product group has 
declined since 2001. Over the years, China and 
other emerging Asia have become more 
specialised in this product category than the 
euro area or the United Kingdom, possibly 
suggesting more competitive pressure for the 
developed economies in the future. Nevertheless 
the reader should bear in mind that the growing 
specialisation of China and other emerging Asia 
in research-intensive industries may be partly 
exaggerated. The classification used, which 
categorises broad industries such as “computer 
equipment” or “optics” as, overall, research-
intensive sectors, is unfortunately unable to 
distinguish the presence of labour-intensive 
activities as a result of multinationals operating 
in these low-wage locations.
Box 2
PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKET REGULATION ACROSS DEVELOPED ECONOMIES
Excessive product and labour market regulation may slow down the process of adjustment to 
the forces of globalisation, by constraining firms’ ability to react to a rapidly changing economic 
environment. In the face of competition-hampering product market regulation, firms may have 
fewer incentives to reorientate their production to new areas and may be discouraged from 
innovating. Moreover, the process of market entry and exit of firms may be slowed down, 
Chart 9 Developments in revealed comparative advantages
(index; annual data)
Sources: CHELEM and ECB calculations.
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leading to higher adjustment costs. Employment protection legislation may hinder the creation 
of new firms and their rapid expansion, while an excessive level of protection may decrease 
the ability of markets to adjust. 
Chart A compares the extent of product market regulation in the manufacturing and services 
sectors in the euro area with that in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, based 
on an index of product market regulation compiled by the OECD. While it is not possible to 
gauge the amount of “excessive” regulation, these data suggest that product markets are 
substantially more regulated in the euro area than in the United States or the United Kingdom, 
probably making them more insulated from competitive forces. However, since 1992 there has 
been an increase in the tendency towards deregulation, in part likely to be related to the single 
European market. 
Of the manufacturing sectors, transport equipment and chemicals (including pharmaceuticals) 
are the most deregulated, see Chart B. The most protected sector is that of other non-metallic 
mineral products.  
Employment protection legislation is also 
stricter in the euro area than in the United 
Kingdom or the United States (see Table). 
Protection has fallen somewhat in Germany 
and Italy since the late 1980s, but remains 
broadly unchanged in France. Overall, while 
this evidence is very tentative, the lower 
degree of flexibility of product and labour 
markets in the euro area could suggest that 
further adjustments in industry and export 
structures are to be expected, in particular in 
Table Summary index of the strictness of 
employment protection legislation
  Late 1980s  Late 1990s  2003
euro area  2.9  2.5  2.3
 Germany  3.2  2.5  2.2
 France  2.7  3.0  3.0
 Italy  3.6  2.7  1.9
United Kingdom  0.6  0.6  0.7
United States  0.2  0.2  0.2
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2004)
Chart A Regulation of goods and services 
markets across countries
(index)
Sources: OECD and ECB calculations.
Chart B Euro area product market 
regulation indices across selected 
manufacturing sectors
(index)
Sources: OECD and ECB calculations.
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2.2.3 SPECIALISATION BY SECTOR ACCORDING TO 
TECHNOLOGY CONTENT
This section focuses on the more detailed second 
classification outlined above, which adds useful 
additional information on technology intensity 
across export sectors by examining their research 
content. This breakdown helps to further 
highlight the strengths and shortcomings of the 
euro area’s export specialisation, by allowing us 
to assess how changes in export specialisation 
are related to the dynamism of world imports 
and to productivity growth differentials in 
different sectors across economies. 
We first turn to a sectoral assessment of the 
dynamism and volatility of world import demand, 
which we will then relate to the export specialisation 
across countries. Table 3 shows that there are large 
differences in the growth rates of world imports 
and their volatility across sectors. On average over 
the period 1993-2004, the most dynamic sector of 
world demand was the pharmaceutical sector 
(though starting from a relatively small base at 
around 3% of world imports), followed by 
electronics and communications equipment and 
office and computing machinery.19 These three 
sectors grew by an average of above 10% per 
annum and, according to the OECD (2005) 
classification, all have a high technological 
content. The coefficient of variation (defined as 
the most regulated sectors.1 As the nature and the duration of adjustment costs are determined 
by the flexibility of the economy to respond to shocks, this calls for further deregulation of 
euro area product and labour markets in order to keep transitional losses to a minimum.
1  As regards the industrial structure of the EU, this conclusion is corroborated by van Ark (2005), who confirms that the adjustment 
process towards a new industrial structure has developed more slowly in the EU than in the United States. 
19 As these data are measured in value terms, and given the 
generally falling prices of ICT goods, the rise in world trade in 
ICT goods in volume terms may have been growing at even 
faster rates. 
Table 3 Summary statistics on world imports by sector
(average 1993-2004, unless otherwise specified)
Sources: CHELEM and ECB calculations.
  Average   Standard  Coefficient  Share of
 growth  deviation  of  variation  world  imports
 %    Index  %
High-technology industries  10.0  7.9  0.8  22.8
Aircraft and spacecraft   4.3  10.6  2.5  1.8
Pharmaceuticals   15.1  7.6  0.5  3.3
Office, accounting and computing machinery   10.2  9.0  0.9  5.5
Electronics and communications equipment   11.9  13.0  1.1  8.8
Medical, precision and optical instruments   7.9  10.1  1.3  3.4
Medium-high-technology industries  7.6  8.3  1.1  35.5
Electrical machinery and apparatus  9.3  9.4  1.0  5.1
Motor vehicles, railroad and transport equipment  7.5  7.3  1.0  10.9
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals   7.9  9.5  1.2  6.7
Machinery and equipment, n.e.s.   7.1  9.1  1.3  12.7
Medium-low-technology industries  8.3  12.2  1.5  14.5
Building and repairing of ships and boats   7.4  7.9  1.1  0.8
Rubber and plastic products   8.8  9.9  1.1  4.4
Other non-metallic mineral products  5.6  8.2  1.5  1.5
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  8.9  15.8  1.8  7.7
Low-technology industries  5.8  7.2  1.2  27.3
Wood, pulp, paper and paper products  6.1  11.4  1.9  3.0
Agriculture, food products, beverages and tobacco   4.6  8.8  1.9  9.1
Textiles, clothing and footwear   4.8  6.8  1.4  6.9
Not elsewhere specified products (n.e.s.)  9.2  11.5  1.3  8.3
Total 7.6  8.0  1.1  100.021
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the standard deviation of annual growth of world 
imports by sector, normalised by the average 
growth of world imports in the respective sector) 
shows that the volatility of import growth for these 
sectors (in particular pharmaceuticals) was also 
among the lowest over the 1993-2004 period. After 
the 2000 recession, however, world import demand 
for information and communication technology 
(ICT) goods fell sharply (though it recovered in 
2003-04), suggesting that a specialisation in these 
sectors could perhaps explain weaknesses in 
export performance in recent years.    
In contrast to these rapidly growing industries, 
world demand in four sectors – including 
aircraft and spacecraft; agriculture, fishing, 
food, beverages and tobacco; textiles, clothing 
and footwear; and other non-metallic mineral 
products – has grown at only around half this 
rate. Three of these sectors have either a low or 
medium-low technological content. Moreover, 
these sectors were also more prone to 
fluctuations over time in the 1993-2004 period. 
Overall, it seems that import demand in most 
high-tech sectors is faster growing and more 
stable than in low-tech sectors, aside perhaps 
from the aftermath of the 2000 recession.
Against this background, how does the euro 
area export sector fare in the most dynamic 
sectors of world demand? Table 4 shows the 
Balassa index of the euro area’s revealed 
comparative advantage in the 17 sectors of the 
technology classification in comparison with 
its main developed and emerging market 
competitors (for a discussion of export 
specialisation across individual euro area 
countries, see Box 3). Three key stylised facts 
emerge, some of which can provide an 
explanation as to why the euro area’s export 
2 DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EURO AREA 
EXPORTS Table 4 Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage across regions
(index, average 1993-2004, based on USD values)
           Other
  euro   United     emerging   
 area  USA  Kingdom  Japan  China  Asia  CEECs
Memo item:
Share in total world exports of goods  17.50  12.0 5.0  8.6 4.40 11.70 5.3
High-technology  industries    0.9 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.7 0.3
Aircraft and spacecraft   1.1 3.2 2.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3
Pharmaceuticals   1.6 0.9 2.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5
Office, accounting and computing machinery   0.7  1.0  1.4 1.4 1.4 2.5 0.2
Electronics and communications equipment   0.7  1.1  0.9  1.7 1.1 2.5 0.3
Medical, precision and optical instruments   1.1 1.7 1.2 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.3
Medium-high-technology  industries    1.2 1.1 1.0 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.9
Electrical machinery and apparatus  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.5 1.4 1.1 1.0
Motor vehicles, railroad and transport equipment  1.1 0.9 0.8 1.9 0.2 0.4 0.7
Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals   1.3 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.0
Machinery and equipment, n.e.s.   1.4 1.2 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.9
Medium-low-technology  industries    0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.9
Building and repairing of ships and boats   1.0  0.3  0.5  2.9 0.9 1.8 1.4
Rubber and plastics products   1.0  1.0  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.0  0.9
Other non-metallic mineral products  1.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.4 0.6 1.9
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.5  0.7  2.6
Low-technology  industries    0.9 0.8 0.9 0.3 1.6 1.0 1.2
Wood, pulp, paper and paper products  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.2  0.4  0.7  1.1
Agriculture, food products, beverages and tobacco   0.8  1.0  0.7  0.1  0.8  0.7  1.1
Textiles, clothing and footwear   0.9  0.4  0.5  0.2  3.6 1.7 1.5
Not elsewhere specified products (n.e.s.)  1.1 0.8 1.4 0.7 1.1 0.7 1.1
Sources: CHELEM and ECB calculations
Notes: A value higher than 1 (marked in bold) indicates a comparative advantage in that sector. Euro area exports exclude intra-euro 
area trade. Total exports exclude exports of energy-related products. For a list of the countries included in each geographical area, see 
Annex A.22
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market share has held up relatively well 
vis-à-vis the other large developed economies 
(as seen in Charts 5 and 6 above). First, on 
average, the euro area specialises in medium-
tech industries, most notably motor vehicles, 
railroad and transport equipment; chemicals; 
and machinery and equipment – all sectors in 
which imports are growing at a rate close to the 
world average. As for high-tech industries, the 
euro area tends to have an uneven record, as it 
concentrates on just a few of these sectors (two 
of which, i.e. pharmaceuticals, and medical, 
precision and optical instruments, are among 
the fastest-growing sectors of world demand, 
however). In others, such as computers and 
electronics, it has a low revealed comparative 
advantage, which perhaps explains why the 
euro area has not suffered as much of a loss 
in export market share following the bursting 
of the ICT bubble in 2000. Moreover, its 
specialisation in medium-low and low 
technology industries is also relatively weak.
Second, the Balassa indices computed for the 
euro area (except perhaps for pharmaceuticals) 
are relatively close to the index for all sectors, 
suggesting that the specialisation is spread 
fairly evenly across industries. This could 
reflect the fact that, as a relatively large region, 
the euro area has a more diversified production 
and export structure than other countries, thus 
leading to an exhaustion of economies of scale 
for a larger number of industries. The advantage 
of this more diversified production structure 
would be that the euro area is perhaps less 
strongly affected by a downturn in demand in 
any single sector than other economies. But 
such a structure to some extent also reflects 
different specialisations of individual euro area 
countries (see Box 3), which could pose the risk 
of asymmetric shocks in the event of a downturns 
in particular sectors.
Third, the revealed comparative advantages of 
the euro area are largely concentrated in sectors 
where the emerging market competitors are still 
relatively weak. The latter have mainly entered 
low and medium-low technology sectors (more 
specifically textiles, clothing and footwear and 
basic metals and fabricated metal products as 
well as other non-metallic mineral products). 
Emerging Asia is also specialised in electrical 
machinery and apparatus – the only medium-tech 
sector on which euro area exports are not strongly 
focused – and the ICT-related sectors. The euro 
area thus stands in sharp contrast to other 
developed economies, which may on average be 
more exposed to competition from the Asian 
emerging countries in the ICT sectors.  
This is not to say that competition in sectors of 
traditional euro area stronghold may not become 
more intense in the future, however. Indeed, the 
export specialisation of the CEECs, and to a 
lesser extent also emerging Asia, has already 
started to increase over the past decade in the 
medium-high-tech sectors motor vehicles and 
transport equipment as well as other machinery 
and equipment, albeit to a generally smaller 
extent than for the high-tech sectors. 
Box 3
EXPORT SPECIALISATION OF EURO AREA COUNTRIES
The export specialisation of the euro area as a whole hides considerable differences between 
individual euro area economies. The euro area’s overall strong specialisation in medium-high-
tech exports can largely be explained by the export structures of Germany, France and Italy, 
which all have their strongest specialisation in medium-high-tech sectors. Some countries, 
however, are much more specialised in high-tech goods than the euro area average and have 
benefited from the change in the composition of world trade towards more high-tech products: 
these include Ireland and the Netherlands. Within high-tech goods, both countries have a 
revealed comparative advantage in exports of pharmaceuticals; medical, precision and optical 23
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instruments; and office, accounting and computing machinery, although in the case of the 
Netherlands, the specialisation in latter sector may largely reflect re-exports, as the Netherlands 
is an important logistical centre for ICT exports to other European countries. 
Countries with predominantly low-tech export specialisations include Greece and Portugal. The 
specialisation of these countries is particularly strong in the export of textile products. In this 
context, Italy – in addition to its specialisation in medium-high-tech products – also stands out 
as being relatively specialised in low-tech sectors, largely due to its large textile export sector. 
Unless these countries are able to differentiate their products and exploit high-end markets for 
textiles, it may happen that these sectors will decline over time in the face of strong competition 
from exporters in countries with lower labour costs.
The highest specialisation index in any given sector occurs for Finland, which is strongly 
specialised in the production of wood, pulp, paper and paper products. This can be explained 
by forestry being the country’s most important natural resource and by the fact that this industry 
cluster is exploiting economies of scale.
Sources: CHELEM and ECB calculations.
1) EA stands for euro area. In this table, it includes intra- and extra-euro area exports.
Table Export specialisation by euro area country and export sector
(Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage)
   of  
   which:
 HEA1) DE  FR  IT  NL  ES  IR B/LUX FI  AU  PT  GR
Memo item: 
Share  in  total  world  exports  30.8  0.5 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
High-technology  industries    0.7 0.7 1.0 0.5 1.1 0.4 1.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.3
Aircraft  and  spacecraft    0.8 0.6 2.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
Pharmaceuticals    1.4 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.2 0.9 4.4 1.9 0.3 1.4 0.4 0.9
Office, accounting and computing 
machinery    0.7 0.5 0.5 0.3 1.9 0.3 3.8 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1
Electronics and communications 
equipment    0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.8 0.4 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.2
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments    0.9 1.2 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.2
Medium-high-technology  industries   1.2 1.4 1.1 1.2 0.8 1.3 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.4
Electrical  machinery  and  apparatus  0.9 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.1 1.3 1.4 0.5
Motor vehicles, railroad and transport 
equipment  1.2 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.5 2.3 0.1 1.4 0.4 1.0 1.2 0.1
Chemicals  excluding  pharmaceuticals   1.2 1.2 1.4 0.6 1.5 0.8 3.1 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6
Machinery  and  equipment,  n.e.s.    1.2 1.5 1.0 1.9 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.7 0.7 0.4
Medium-low-technology  industries  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 0.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 0.8 1.5
Building and repairing of ships 
and  boats    0.6 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.1 2.9 0.1 0.4 0.8
Rubber  and  plastics  products    1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.2 0.3 2.0 0.7 1.2 0.8 0.8
Energy  products    1.1 1.0 0.0 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other  non-metallic  mineral  products  1.3 0.9 1.1 2.3 0.7 2.4 0.5 1.4 0.9 1.5 2.5 3.0
Basic metals and fabricated metal 
products  0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.5 1.7
Low-technology  industries  1.0 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.6 2.0
Wood,  pulp,  paper  and  paper  products  1.2 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.3 1.0 7.8 2.4 2.8 0.5
Agriculture, food, beverages and 
tobacco    1.0 0.5 1.3 0.7 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 3.1
Textiles,  clothing  and  footwear    0.9 0.5 0.7 2.1 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.8 3.6 2.9
Not elsewhere specified products 
(n.e.s.)  0.9 1.1 0.5 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.6 0.3 1.1 0.3 0.5
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In what follows we aim to gauge whether the 
sectoral specialisation of the euro area is 
moving into the most dynamic sectors of world 
demand, and how it compares with the sectoral 
specialisation of its competitors. Charts 10 
to 13 thus bring together evidence on recent 
changes in export specialisation across countries 
in the last few years and the development of 
world import growth for the main sectors.20  
Using as a discrimination criterion the growth 
of world imports in a specific sector vis-à-vis 
the average total world import growth of 7.6%, 
we can distinguish sectors of increasing 
specialisation as “rising stars” or “declining 
stars”, depending on whether they are growing 
at, respectively, higher or lower rates than world 
trade average. Alternatively, they are defined as 
“missed opportunities” or “retreats”, when a 
falling specialisation in a sector is associated 
with, respectively, higher or lower import 
growth than the world average.
Comparing two periods in time (1993-98 and 
1999-2004) it would appear that among the 
fastest-growing sectors of world demand, the 
euro area has increased its specialisation in 
pharmaceuticals; electronics and communications 
equipment; as well as in office, accounting and 
computing machinery; medical, precision and 
optical instruments; and chemicals, albeit all to 
a relatively small extent.21 These developments 
would appear to augur well for euro area 
prospects as all such sectors are intensive in 
high or medium-high technology and have 
relatively dynamic world demand, which 
Chart 10 Change in euro area specialisation and world trade growth
Note: The change in export specialisation is defined as the change in the Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage on average 
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20  These charts are based on charts produced by the International 
Trade Centre, see http://www.intracen.org/.
 21 This finding mirrors earlier findings by the Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC) task force of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB) (2004) that the sectoral specialisation of 
European production had only experienced relatively small 
changes in over time, and, when changes in specialisation 
occurred, they happened relatively slowly. The paper found that 
the speed of reallocation of resources across value added sectors 
was higher in the United States than in the EU. 25
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2 DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EURO AREA 
EXPORTS
suggests that the euro area is trying to adapt to 
changes in the competitive environment. At the 
same time, however, their relative weights in 
total exports are mostly fairly modest, as 
illustrated by the size of the bubbles in the 
chart. The euro area is retreating, by contrast, 
in some products of lower technological content 
such as textiles, non-metallic mineral products 
and machinery and equipment, the latter still 
representing still a large share of total exports, 
therefore signalling the likelihood of persistent 
adjustment costs in the future. 
As a comparison, Japan seems to be following 
a different adjustment strategy, largely retreating 
from most fast-growing high-tech sectors. One 
explanation for this is that Japan is off-shoring 
some of the production of these goods to other 
Asian countries, which are then used as export 
platforms.22 Meanwhile, market share losses in 
the medium-high-tech goods category, which 
forms the most important sector for Japan in 
terms of size, have been relatively contained. 
Interestingly, Japan has increased its export 
specialisation in some of the fast-growing low-
tech products in the rubber and plastic products 
and basic and fabricated metal products 
industries. 
The United States and the United Kingdom23 
are also retreating from their specialisation 
in the ICT sector, where competition from 
emerging Asia is likely to be intense and may 
have squeezed profit margins. By contrast, both 
22 See  Abe  (2003).
23  This result stands somewhat in contrast with the findings of 
Buisan et al (2006), which indicate that the United Kingdom has 
increased its export market share in office machinery and 
computers as well as radio, TV and communications equipment 
in volume terms. These results can be reconciled by the fact that 
the rise in the export market share of ICT goods in volume terms 
can largely be explained by a fall in relative export prices of 
these goods, see Buisan et al (2006); our results, by contrast, are 
based on values data, thus hiding developments in volumes 
versus relative prices.  
Chart 11 Change in Japan’s specialisation and world trade growth
Note: The change in export specialisation is defined as the change in the Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage on average 
between 1993-98 and 1999-04. The size of the bubbles is determined by the share of exports in total exports.
World trade growth, percentages p.a. 1993-2004
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countries have increased their specialisation in 
the fast-growing high-tech pharmaceutical 
sector and in chemicals, and the United States 
additionally in medical, precision and optical 
instruments as well as rubber and plastic 
products – the latter a relatively dynamic sector 
of lower technological content. 
2.2.4 EXPORT SPECIALISATION AND 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
A further benchmark we use to assess 
adjustments in euro area trade is whether the 
euro area is increasingly specialising in the 
sectors where productivity growth is strong. 
Fast productivity growth allows firms to 
compete internationally and increase their 
exports, as productive firms tend to choose 
to export. Clerides et al. (1998) model the 
interaction between exports and productivity, 
considering sunk costs of entry into foreign 
markets.24 In their model, only the relatively 
productive firms will choose to pay the costs to 
enter foreign markets; less productive firms 
cannot recover them, not being able to compete 
with their more productive competitors. There 
is also a large empirical literature on the 
relationship between exports and productivity. 
The evidence generally supports the hypothesis 
that exporting producers are more productive 
than non-exporters, with most evidence pointing 
to a causal link from productivity to exports via 
the choice of more efficient producers to engage 
in exporting.25
24 They include in particular: (i) costs associated with gaining 
an understanding of the foreign market and the competition 
therein; (ii) the cost of adjusting product characteristics and 
(iii) marketing costs.
25  Evidence of a link between productivity and exporting in the 
other direction (i.e. based on the idea that exporters acquire 
knowledge, technology and skills that increase productivity) is 
more mixed. See Bernard and Jensen (2001), Marin (1992), 
Kunst and Marin (1989), Proudman and Redding (1998), 
Clerides et al. (1997) among others. 
Chart 12 Change in the United States’ specialisation and world trade growth
Note: The change in export specialisation is defined as the change in the Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage on average 
between 1993-98 and 1999-04. The size of the bubbles is determined by the share of exports in total exports.
World trade growth, percentages p.a. 1993-2004
Change in
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2 DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EURO AREA 
EXPORTS Chart 13 Change in the United Kingdom’s specialisation and world trade growth
Note: The change in export specialisation is defined as the change in the Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage on average 
between 1993-98 and 1999-04. The size of the bubbles is determined by the share of exports in total exports.
World trade growth, percentages p.a. 1993-2004
Change in
specialisation
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In this section, we thus evaluate first whether 
euro area exporters are specialised in the sectors 
with the strongest productivity growth and 
second, whether they have increased their 
specialisation in those sectors where productivity 
growth is high relative to other large developed 
economies,26 while moving out of sectors where 
productivity growth is relatively weak. Ideally, 
one should look at estimates of total factor 
productivity, controlling for the quality of 
labour and abstracting from capital deepening. 
At a sectoral level, total factor productivity is 
inherently difficult to measure, however, a 
reason for which we focus on labour productivity 
(which implicitly assumes homogeneous skills 
and which can be influenced by changes in the 
capital/labour ratio), defined as value added per 
employee.27
As shown by Chart 14, the euro area largely 
specialises in export sectors with high 
productivity growth overall. Notably, for 
pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, motor 
vehicles and transport equipment and other 
machinery and equipment goods – the sectors 
of strongest revealed comparative advantage – 
productivity growth is relatively high in relation 
to other sectors.28
Turning to the cross-country comparison, 
although, as widely known, whole-economy 
labour productivity growth in the euro area has 
26  Ideally, we would also like to compare euro area productivity 
growth with that in developing economies but are prevented 
from doing so by data limitations. 
27  The productivity data used are from the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005. 
Deflators for industry or region aggregates are computed 
using the Tornqvist index. For the methodology, see GDDC 
http://www.ggdc.net. 
28 In this chart, we exclude office, accounting and computing 
machinery as well as electronics and communications equipment, 
for which productivity growth was much higher in all countries 
than for other sectors. 28
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lagged behind that of the United States in the 
last decade, in some sectors productivity growth 
was relatively strong in the euro area during 
1993-2003 compared with the United States, 
United Kingdom and Japan (see Table 5).29 
These include chemicals and pharmaceuticals;30 
medical precision and optical instruments; 
motor vehicles and transport equipment; 
machinery and equipment; wood and paper 
products; as well as agricultural and food 
products. In all of these sectors except for 
machinery and equipment, the euro area has 
increased its export specialisation. However, 
the increase in export specialisation in some of 
the high-tech industries – including aircraft 
and spacecraft, as well as electronics and 
communication equipment – cannot be 
explained by higher productivity growth.  
Chart 15 summarises this information for the 
euro area: it shows that, overall, the relationship 
between relative sectoral labour productivity 
growth and changes in export specialisation – 
between 1993-98 and 1999-2004 – is very weak. 
While there is evidence that the euro area has 
increased its focus on some export sectors in 
Chart 14 Euro area sectoral productivity 
growth and export specialisation
Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry 
Database, October 2005, and ECB calculations.
Note: Productivity growth is for the period 1993-2003 and the 
index of revealed comparative advantage for 1993-2004.
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Chart 15 Euro area relative sectoral 
productivity growth and change in export 
specialisation
Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry 
Database, October 2005, and ECB calculations
Notes: The change in revealed comparative advantage is 
measured as the absolute change in the Balassa index between 
1993-98 and 1999-2004. Relative productivity growth (average 
1993-2003) is measured as an index, where 1 is the average 
of all four developed economies, with an index value greater 
than 1 (smaller than 1) denoting higher (lower) than average 
productivity growth.
x-axis: change in revealed comparative advantage
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which productivity growth is high, this is not 
true for all sectors. In part, the weakness of this 
relationship may be due to the aggregate nature 
of these data, which obviously cannot take into 
account the considerable heterogeneity of firms 
within the same sector.31
2.3  EURO AREA EXPORTS – SUMMARY
This section has shown that over the past 
decade, structural factors that could be 
associated with globalisation have had an 
impact on global export market shares. An 
analysis of exports by factor intensity 
shows that the euro area’s specialisation is 
relatively balanced and evenly distributed over 
predominantly capital-intensive, research-
29  For a comparison of labour productivity growth between Europe 
and the United States, see for instance van Ark (2005).
30  No breakdown is available to allow a separate analysis of these 
two sectors.
31  Recent trade literature has increasingly pointed out that firm 
heterogeneity within sectors is often as large as that across 
sectors. In particular, Bernard et al. (2003) show that within 
about 450 four-digit sectors, firms one standard deviation away 
from the median firm are 66% more productive than the median 
firm, while the dispersion of firms across sectors is only very 
slightly higher. 29
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2 DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EURO AREA 
EXPORTS Table 5 Sectoral labour productivity growth in the developed economies
(average annual percentage change over the period 1993-2003, unless otherwise specified)
Sources: Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database, October 2005 and ECB calculations.
Note: For Japan, the average of labour productivity growth is for the period 1993-2002 due to the unavailability of data. 
  euro area  United States  United Kingdom  Japan
Aircraft and spacecraft  1.6  0.4  4.3  6.5
Pharmaceuticals and chemicals  5.7  4.2  4.7  2.4
Office, accounting and computing machinery  75.4  83.8  82.4  47.6
Radio, TV and communications equipment  22.9  40.8  22.5  37.0
Medical, precision and optical equipments  2.0  1.6  3.5  1.2
Electrical machinery and apparatus  2.2  4.7  -0.1  8.8
Motor vehicles, trailers, railroad and transport equipment  3.7  4.9  1.8  5.3
Pharmaceuticals and chemicals  5.7  4.2  4.7  2.4
Machinery and equipment  3.0  1.6  2.2  -1.8
Building and repairing of ships and boats  1.7  1.9  11.3  11
Rubber and plastic products  2.0  4.3  0.4  -0.4
Other non metallic mineral products  1.3  2.3  2.5  1.1
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  1.4  3.1  1.0  0.3
Wood, pulp, paper products, printing and publishing  2.3  -0.5  0.7  0.5
Agriculture, fishing, food, beverages and tobacco   3.1  0.8  1.9  1.0
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  1.6  4.8  2.8  -1.7
Not elsewhere specified products  1.6  2.2  -0.9  2.1
intensive and labour-intensive goods, the latter 
in contrast to other developed economies. 
Moreover, this relatively high labour-intensive 
export specialisation has not fallen in recent 
years despite the fact that labour-abundant 
countries such as China are increasingly 
penetrating world trade markets. On the basis 
of the traditional theories of comparative 
advantage, this would suggest that more 
adjustment in euro area export structures may 
be likely. On a more positive note, this relative 
specialisation of the euro area in industries 
broadly classified as labour-abundant might 
partly indicate that euro area producers use 
their endowment advantage over low-wage 
countries to produce vertically superior varieties 
of a good at higher prices. To our knowledge 
there is not yet empirical evidence for the extent 
to which this happens in the euro area, however 
some recent studies show that this is a prevailing 
strategy among US producers. Bernard et al. 
(2003), for instance, find that, within industries, 
US firms tend to reallocate production away 
from labour-intensive plants into capital-
intensive plants as import competition rises.
A more detailed breakdown of exports into 
17 sectors has shown that, while its main focus 
is on medium-tech products, the euro area also 
specialises in some of the fast-growing dynamic 
sectors of world demand, such as pharmaceuticals. 
The specialisation in some slower-growing 
sectors, however, such as aircraft and spacecraft 
and non-metallic mineral products, is also quite 
strong. Overall, the euro area does not have 
an extreme specialisation but is relatively 
diversified in its export structure compared 
with other industrialised economies. This 
possibly shelters it from periods of weak world 
demand in any single sector. Over time, euro 
area exporters appear to have increasingly 
moved towards some of the high-technology 
sectors (such as pharmaceuticals, and medical, 
precision and optical instruments, as well as the 
ICT sectors), where world demand is growing 
robustly. By contrast, other developed countries, 30
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such as Japan or the United States, which have 
a much larger concentration in the ICT sectors, 
have been decreasing their specialisation in this 
field. This possibly reflects a squeeze on profit 
margins due to intense competition from 
emerging Asia. Looking ahead, while the 
emerging market countries have largely moved 
into selected high-tech and low and medium-
low-tech sectors so far, there is no reason why 
they may not increase their specialisation in 
medium-high-tech sectors in the future, which 
would expose some of the euro area’s traditional 
stronghold sectors to more competition. Indeed, 
there are signs that this is already happening. 
A consequence of this would be potentially 
large future adjustments in some of the main 
industry sectors of the euro area. Finally, the 
analysis of sectoral productivity has shown 
that euro area firms have increased their 
export specialisation in several sectors where 
productivity growth has been strong relative 
to other large developed economies, although 
overall, the relationship between relative 
productivity growth and changes in export 
specialisation is quite weak. 
On balance, these results are a sign that some 
adjustments in the euro area’s trade structure 
and sectoral specialisation have occurred over 
the past decade, although at face value perhaps 
less than in some of the other industrialised 
economies, which may have been more exposed 
to direct competition from the emerging markets 
due to their export structures. Possible further 
adjustments in the export and industry structures 
of the euro area may therefore take place in the 
future. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
explicitly consider import penetration and the 
composition of imports across countries, which 
are also likely to have changed in recent years, 
partly as a response to globalisation. We turn to 
these issues in the next section. 
3  SPECIALISATION AND IMPORTS OF 
INTERMEDIATES32
3.1 MOTIVATION
The increasing fragmentation of production 
across countries, associated with globalisation, 
has tended to raise the overall import content of 
euro area exports (see ECB (2005)). But while a 
higher import content of exports lowers the trade 
surplus for the same level of exports, efficiency 
gains from relocating economic activity abroad 
may actually induce higher overall exports and/
or stimulate domestic activity via productivity 
channels, which together may more than 
compensate for the higher import content. After 
a discussion of import penetration and recent 
changes in the structure of euro area imports, 
this section provides evidence on international 
sourcing of production inputs in the euro area, 
using imports of intermediate goods as a proxy. 
The results of the analysis are then used to 
construct an alternative indicator of trade 
specialisation, complementing the export analysis 
in Section 2. Finally, changes in intermediate 
imports from low-cost countries are related to 
32  We are grateful for contributions to this section by D. Taglioni.
Chart 16 Import penetration in the 
industrialised countries
(volume index: 1991 = 100)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
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Chart 17 Euro area imports of goods by 
stage of production
(percentages of total non-energy import values)
Sources: CEPII BACI database and ECB calculations.
























changes in value added shares across sectors to 
provide some tentative evidence on whether 
increasing delocalisation is consistent with a rise 
in value added.
3.2  GENERAL TRENDS IN IMPORT PENETRATION
The opening up of international markets, trade 
liberalisation and expansion of international 
production networks have contributed to a sharp 
increase in import penetration for the main 
industrialised economies over the past decade. 
Between 1991 and 2005 the ratio of imports of 
goods and services to GDP in volume terms 
more than tripled in the United States and 
almost doubled in Japan, while developments in 
the euro area and the United Kingdom stand 
somewhere in between (Chart 16).
Looking in particular at the euro area, the import 
composition is skewed towards intermediate 
goods, which represent about half of total imports. 
Such imports include parts and components as 
well as other non-finished goods. The other two 
main categories of imports – i.e. capital and 
consumption goods – have a much smaller share 
(around 20% and 25% respectively). This import 
structure has hardly changed over the last decade, 
possibly with a relatively marginal substitution 
of intermediate for capital goods imports (see 
Chart 17).33 This relative overall stability in 
import patterns hides, however, a fairly large 
shift in euro area imports from developed to 
developing countries, clearly related to very 
competitive sourcing prices in the developing 
countries (Chart 18).34
Such a shift has been particularly noticeable 
for intermediate and capital goods, while the 
shares in consumption goods imports have 
remained virtually unchanged (see Chart 18). 
This signals that emerging economies have 
been used more intensively – at the expense of 
industrialised economies – as providers of 
inputs for production processes, possibly in 
part as a result of an increasing relocation of 
euro area production processes to those 
countries.35 It is important to note in this context 
33  However, for the world, Jones et al. (2004) find that imports of 
parts and components – a subsection of intermediate imports – 
have grown faster than total world trade over the past decade. 
34  The definition of low-income or developing versus industrialised 
or developed economies is based on the definition applied in the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
35  Box 4 discusses the import patterns of the largest three euro area 
countries and Box 5 provides some evidence that imports of 
manufactures from selected low-cost countries have actually 
partially displaced intra-euro area imports.
3 SPECIALISATION 
AND IMPORTS 
OF INTERMEDIATES Chart 18 Euro area goods import values by 
stage of production as percentage of total 
(non-energy) imports
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that – since we are using data in value terms – 
we are very likely underestimating the already 
very clear shift towards imports from emerging 
economies that is taking place in the euro area. 
As unit import prices of those countries are 
considerably lower and have risen more slowly 
than those of industrialised economies, the 
extent to which the import share of developing 
Box 4
THE PATTERN OF IMPORTS IN GERMANY, FRANCE AND ITALY
Imports of the euro area as a whole show a clear pattern of increasing penetration from 
developing economies and declining shares of industrialised countries. This development is 
evident for imports of goods at all stages of production, i.e. consumer, capital and intermediate 
goods. In what follows, we look at developments in the three largest economies of the euro area 
– Germany, France and Italy – together accounting for almost 60% of the total value of euro 
area imports.
A first look at the shares of different import suppliers in the three countries reveals that 
Germany is more open to extra-euro area imports than France and Italy. Germany’s import 
penetration from developing countries is particularly strong (above 30% of total intra-euro area 
plus extra-euro area imports), which can partly be explained by its geographical proximity to 
CEECs and the new EU Member States. 
Notwithstanding the cross-country differences, the pattern of trade relationships seems to be 
undergoing rapid changes, the direction of which is broadly similar across the three countries. 
Increasing import penetration from developing countries and falling shares of developed 
countries (including other euro area countries) are the major trends not only for the euro area 
as a whole but also for the largest individual euro area countries. Moreover, these trends also 
seem to be roughly common across goods of different stages of production.
Imports of intermediate goods clearly show the trend described above for all the three countries, 
which suggests the general presence of a fragmentation of production and the relocation of 
production stages to low-cost economies. In this respect, Germany stands out slightly, having 
recorded the largest increase in the share of developing countries in intermediates imports.
Imports of consumption and capital goods have undergone similar changes. Nevertheless, while 
the rise in developing countries’ shares in consumption goods imports was quite strong in France 
and Italy, Germany experienced a slight fall in those shares. Though this characteristic perhaps 
reflects sluggish German consumption growth over the period and does not rule out substantial 
flows of low-cost consumption imports having entered the German market, it may suggest that, 
as compared to France and Italy, Germany’s low-cost import penetration may arise more from 
the fragmentation of industrial production than from inflows of low-priced consumer goods.
36 However, the available data are, at the required level of 
disaggregation, not sufficiently reliable to fully prove this point.
countries has increased in volume terms is 
likely to be even higher than in value terms, 
possibly by a substantial amount if we consider 
consumption goods imports.3633
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In sum, like the euro area as a whole, the three largest euro area economies seem to have 
experienced increasing import shares of developing economies. However, cross-country 
analysis reveals differences as to the extent to which import penetration relates to fragmentation 
of production. 
Chart C Italian imports of goods by source 
country
(as a share of total non-energy imports, in values)
Chart A German imports of goods by source 
country
(as a share of total non-energy imports, in values)
Chart B French imports of goods by source 
country
(as a share of total non-energy imports, in values)
Sources: BACI and ECB calculations.
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3.3  IMPORTS OF INTERMEDIATE GOODS
A phenomenon often cited as one of the driving 
factors behind the overall increase in import 
penetration is the growing international 
fragmentation of production, which increasingly 
involves developing countries, partly due to 
cost considerations. The extent to which the 
fragmentation of production has occurred is 
difficult to measure, as it assumes a variety of 
forms, which are summarised in Appendix B. 
In this paper, we will focus on one measure 
of international sourcing, intermediate goods 
imported. While having the advantage of good 
comparability across countries, this measure 
clearly also has its limitations. In particular, 
aside from excluding services, it omits a number 
Chart 19 Structure of intermediate goods imports by factor intensity
(percentages of total import values by source region)
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of possibly important types of offshore 
activities.37 The analysis below thus needs to be 
read with caution, but it should, nevertheless, 
provide sufficient input to complement the 
export only-based analysis in Section 2.38
37 Five types are omitted: assembly activities; imports of final 
goods used in domestic production; imports of final goods that 
are sold under the brand-name of a domestic firm; imports of 
final goods that could potentially be produced domestically but 
are not; and imports of goods that could potentially be produced 
domestically for export purposes but are produced abroad and 
exported to third markets.  
38 It may be preferable to use input-output tables to obtain a 
broader measure of international sourcing (that includes off-
shoring and arms-length trade), where intermediate inputs can 
be related to gross output across sectors. For the euro area, 
however, there are severe limitations in using these data for a 
time series analysis of recent trends, as the most recent input-
output tables available are for the year 2000.35
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OF INTERMEDIATES Chart 20 Changes in intermediate import 
shares by technology content
(percentage point changes in shares in total intermediate 
imports between 1994-98 and 1999-2004)




























Starting with the structure of intermediate 
imports across the developed economies, 
Chart 19 provides insights into the production 
inputs, classified by factor content, that are 
imported from low-income economies and 
whether these are in line with comparative 
advantages across countries (the caveats 
applying to the classification of goods by factor 
intensity mentioned in Section 2 should be 
borne in mind). Two main points should be 
noted here: first, all countries – except the 
United States – have increased the share of 
research-intensive imports that comes from the 
developing countries. This demonstrates that 
the developing countries are not just providers 
of labour-intensive production inputs but 
increasingly specialise in research-intensive 
products, corroborating previous evidence 
drawn from the analysis on export specialisation 
in Section 2. Actually, none of the industrialised 
countries mainly imports predominantly labour-
intensive intermediate goods from emerging 
markets. Second, imports of raw materials-
intensive intermediates constitute the largest 
share of imports from developing countries in 
the euro area and Japan, which is due to the 
relative lack of raw materials in those areas. 
Turning to the technology breakdown of 
intermediate imports, Chart 20 shows that 
all of the developed economies – except for 
the United States39 – increasingly import 
intermediate goods of high and medium-high 
technology content, while importing relatively 
fewer medium-low and low-tech goods. This 
could reflect a general shift in these countries 
towards higher technology industries, which in 
turn require a larger share of intermediate 
inputs, or, alternatively, an increased high-tech 
specialisation of other countries.  
In sum, this section has shown that import 
penetration into the industrialised economies 
has been rising at a very fast pace over the 
past decade. Moreover, there has been a 
relative shift from industrialised to developing 
countries as providers of intermediate (and 
other) goods. This has occurred not only for raw 
materials-intensive and labour-intensive goods 
but also for research-intensive goods in most 
developed countries. Finally, for the developed 
economies we observe a shift towards high-tech 
and medium-high-tech intermediate imports, 
possibly reflecting changes in the overall 
industry structures.
3.4  DOES THE TRADE SPECIALISATION CHANGE 
WHEN IMPORTS ARE NETTED OUT OF 
EXPORTS?
This section examines whether the international 
sourcing of production inputs has an impact on 
trade specialisations across countries, by 
looking at an index of trade specialisation that 
nets out intermediate imports of exports and 
comparing this with the earlier results reported 
in the section on exports. To do so, we use a 
slightly modified version of the Lafay index of 
revealed comparative advantage for each 
industry. This indicator – which is described in 
more detail in Annex C – compares the actual 
trade balance of each product group to a 
39  In the United States, the share of high-tech intermediate imports 
has fallen over time, driven almost entirely by a fall in the share 
of electronics and communications equipment in intermediate 
imports. The export specialisation of the United States in this 
sector has also fallen over time, as noted in Section 2.  36
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Box 5
ARE IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES FROM LOW-COST COUNTRIES DISPLACING INTRA-EURO AREA IMPORTS? 
Both intra-euro area and extra-euro area imports of manufactured goods showed robust growth 
in the past decade, recording average annual growth rates in volume terms of around 5% and 
6%, respectively, in the period 1995-2005. Two main factors, both connected to monetary 
integration, are likely to be behind such developments. First, intra-euro area trade has been 
stimulated by the elimination of exchange rate volatility across euro area countries and by 
additional regional integrating factors – sometimes known as “Rose effects” from the name of 
the author of the seminal paper that started the literature on the trade effects of monetary 
unions. Second, there is evidence that the creation of the euro – by generating a larger and less 
fragmented market – has facilitated import penetration from outside the euro area, thus fostering 
extra-euro area trade.1 Somewhat surprisingly, however, the growth rate of extra-euro area 
imports exceeded that of intra-euro area imports in both value and volume terms, which shows 
up in a decline in the ratio of intra- to extra-euro area imports of manufactures, see Chart A.
This decline in the ratio (while not having any particular significance as regards the integrating 
effects of Monetary Union in the euro area) shows clearly that potent factors in addition to 
those associated with Monetary Union are playing a role in shaping trade developments in the 
euro area. The most critical factor is, without doubt, the recent acceleration in the process of 
globalisation and the enlargement of the EU. For the euro area this has meant higher imports 
of low-cost manufactured consumption goods and higher trade in intermediates related to the 
process of industrial delocalisation to low-cost countries. As Chart B shows, in the past decade 
1  For a discussion of the euro’s effect on euro area trade, see Baldwin (2006). 
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations.
Notes: Based on trade in value terms. Share of euro area imports 
from a given country/region divided by total (intra-plus extra-
euro area) imports. NMS stands for new EU Member States; 
candidate countries include Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
Chart A Ratio of intra- to extra-euro area 
imports in manufactures
(index)
Chart B Changes in euro area manufacturing 
import shares by country of origin
(percentage point changes, 1995-2005)
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations. 
Note: Intra-euro area trade is defined as the average of intra-
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OF INTERMEDIATES the shares of low-cost countries in euro area imports of manufactures – particularly those of 
China and the new EU Member States – have increased considerably, accompanied by a loss in 
the import shares of both intra-euro area traders and high-cost extra-euro area importers (the 
United States, Japan and the United Kingdom).
A sectoral analysis of the import penetration from China and the new EU Member States offers 
additional important insights into the unfolding impact of globalisation on the euro area. First, there is 
an evident negative correlation between the import penetration from low-cost suppliers and the changes 
in the intra-euro area/extra-euro area import ratio (Charts C and D), suggesting an extensive substitution 
of trade between euro area countries with imports from China and the new EU Member States. A 
notable exception is the chemicals sector, where intra-euro area trade rose sharply. 
Second, there is a considerable difference between China and the new EU Member States in 
terms of their supplying patterns to the euro area. China has gained markets in the euro area 
throughout the spectrum of sectors, including non-labour-intensive sectors such as office 
machinery or telecommunications equipment. Gains for the new Member States, by contrast, 
seem more or less restricted to one – though the largest – category of manufactures, i.e. 
machinery and transport equipment, which suggests a considerable relocation of capital-
intensive and research-intensive production from the euro area to these countries. However, 
while turning their production structure towards higher-tech sectors, the new Member States 
have recorded substantial losses in their share in euro area imports of some highly labour-
intensive products (namely clothing and footwear) in favour of China.
Overall, alongside the the trade-creating effect of European Monetary Integration, globalisation 
and the strengthening of international competition have greatly influenced recent developments 
in euro area imports. In particular, imports of manufactures from low-cost countries are seen 
to have displaced part of the imports from both intra-euro area and high-cost extra-euro area 
importers. Among the low-cost trading partners, China and the new EU Member States stand 
Source: Eurostat, Comext database, and ECB calculations
Note: Based on two-digit SITC sectors categorised under the following selection of broader one-digit sectors: 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic 
manufactures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment) and 8 (other manufactured goods).
Chart C Change in China’s share in euro area 
imports and the declining intra-/extra-euro area 
import ratio in manufactures
Chart D Change in the share of the new EU Member 
States in euro area imports and the declining 
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out as having recorded substantial growth in import shares in the euro area over a wide range 
of manufacturing products in the past decade. Nevertheless, while China’s gain seems to be 
across a range of different manufacturing products, the gain of the new Member States is 
predominantly concentrated in machinery and transport equipment.
hypothetical trade balance, which is constructed 
by multiplying the trade balance for all goods 
by the share of each product group in total 
trade. The specialisation index is derived  as the 
difference between the actual and the 
hypothetical trade balance relative to total 
trade, and abstracts from variations in trade 
balances of individual countries linked to the 
business cycle. A positive value indicates that 
an industry has a structural surplus and a 
negative value that it has a structural deficit. In 
contrast to the standard index, however, we use 
intermediate imports instead of total imports in 
the calculation of this indicator, which is likely 
to better reflect the extent of international 
production sharing across countries.
Looking first at the breakdown of goods by 
factor intensity, Table 6 shows that there are no 
major changes in the pattern of specialisation 
across countries compared with the earlier 
results.40 In particular, the specialisation 
of the euro area in predominantly capital-
intensive, research-intensive and labour-intensive 
products is confirmed, with very little change 
over time. Notable for the United States is the 
increase in the specialisation in research-
intensive exports and the fall in that in 
raw-materials-intensive and labour-intensive 
products over time.  
Before turning to the detailed sectoral 
breakdown, it is important to underline a caveat 
relating to the subsequent analysis. While a 
more detailed sectoral breakdown allows us to 
gain further insights about specialisation 
patterns across sectors, the more disaggregated 
these specialisation indices are constructed, the 
more significant are also the limitations of this 
approach. In particular, relating intermediate 
imports to the exports of a sector implicitly 
assumes that the intermediate imports will be 
used in the same sector. Although this is likely 
to be the case to a certain extent in some sectors, 
it may be very misleading in others (e.g. imports 
of intermediate goods in the electronics sector 
may well be used on a large scale in the 
production of cars or other equipment 
goods).41 
Table 6 Revealed comparative advantage by factor intensity
(index1; average 1994-2004 and change between 1994-98 and 1999-2004)
Sources: CHELEM and BACI, and ECB calculations
1) Modified Lafay index of revealed comparative advantage 
  euro area  United   United   Japan  China  Other   CEECs
   States  Kingdom      emerging
          Asia
   Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change
Raw-materials-intensive  -109  -6 -60 -31 -15  -5  -191  -1 -55 -12  -23 -30  15  -2
Labour-intensive  22  -1  -13 -4  -21  -1  -1 7  101  2  33 -4 -1  -3
Capital-intensive  39  3  -1 5 3  0  74  19  -25  -4  -20  21  18  -5
Research-intensive  48  4 74 30 32  6  118  -25  -20 14  10 13  -31  10
40  The results in this section are based on the average for the period 
1994-2004, as data on imports for 1993 were not available.
41 These limitations also apply to the standard Lafay index of 
sectoral revealed comparative advantage that is based on total 
rather than intermediate imports. 39
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OF INTERMEDIATES Table 7 Revealed comparative advantage by industry
(index,1 average 1994-2004 and change between 1994-98 and 1999-2004)
Sources: CHELEM and BACI, and ECB calculations.
1) Modified Lafay index of revealed comparative advantage.
  euro area  United   United   Japan  China  Other   CEECs
   States  Kingdom      emerging
             Asia
   Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change Average Change
High-technology 
industries -10.3  4.8  24.1  24.2  38.5  11.1  10.4  -29.7  3.4  1.1  15.4  -16.3  -9.9  8.3
Aircraft and spacecraft   -4.1  -1.7  20.8  3.3  1.6  3.2  -5.1  -2.2  -3.1  0.0  -4.4  -2.0  0.5  1.3
Pharmaceuticals    5.0  4.9  3.8  4.2  14.4 9.0  -4.3 1.2  2.2 -0.6  -1.1  1.0 -1.7  -0.1
Office, accounting and 
computing  machinery    -5.7  -0.3 -3.9 -3.8 12.2  -5.8  8.2  -12.4 20.9 20.4  38.8 -5.2 -1.0 4.3
Electronics and 
communications 
equipment  -12.4 0.3 -12.7  15.1  1.1  3.9  0.5  -16.5 -20.3 -17.1  -17.8  -9.1  -8.4  1.3
Medical, precision and 
optical  instruments    6.8  1.7  16.2 5.5 9.2  0.7  11.1  0.3 3.6  -1.5  -0.1  -1.0 0.7  1.5
Medium-high-technology 
industries 39.1  -10.9  -7.1  -16.7  2.5  -11.3  90.7  -13.1  -24.7  18.3  -24.9  18.9  -25.2  21.1
Electrical machinery 
and  apparatus  -4.0  -3.8  -12.0 -2.4 -4.2  -0.1 11.2  -6.0  3.9  3.3  -5.3 -0.1 -7.1 2.7
Motor vehicles, railroad 
and transport equipment  31.1  2.2  7.6  -3.0  9.8  1.7  63.4  3.5  2.0  0.3  10.5  6.1  14.5  14.4
Chemicals excluding 
pharmaceuticals    -14.4 3.9 -11.2  -7.0  -13.2 -2.7 -23.2 -0.6 -35.2  -1.4  -27.4  6.6  -24.5 -1.3
Machinery and 
equipment, n.e.s.   26.4 -13.2  8.6  -4.3  10.0  -10.2  39.3  -9.9  4.5  16.0  -2.7  6.3  -8.1  5.4
Medium-low-technology 
industries  -40.5 2.0 -38.8  0.6 -52.9 -2.1 -37.9  7.3 -69.5  -8.7  -43.2  18.1  -7.2  -22.9
Building and repairing 
of ships and boats   3.3  0.2  1.0  -0.1  1.7  0.0  7.8  -1.5  2.9  -0.5  7.1  0.8  5.0  0.2
Rubber and plastic 
products    -3.2  0.6 -0.6 -0.7  -16.3 1.4  0.8  -1.6  -23.9 -1.3  -2.8  2.7  -21.0  -3.5
Other non-metallic 
mineral  products  -1.5  -0.5 -6.2 -1.5 -3.2  -2.1  -4.5 0.5  4.1 -3.5  -5.2  2.1 -4.1  -1.5
Basic metals and 
fabricated metal products  -39.1  1.7  -32.9  2.8  -35.0  -1.4  -42.0  9.9  -52.7  -3.4  -42.4  12.4  12.9  -18.0
Low-technology 
industries  11.7  4.0 21.7 -8.1 11.9 2.2  -63.2  35.5 90.8  -10.8  52.8  -20.7 42.2  -6.6
Wood, pulp, paper, 
paper  products  -8.8  2.6  -12.7 -3.0  -18.7 1.3  -15.6 2.5  -15.4  6.4  -3.1  1.0  -10.0 0.4
Agriculture, food 
products, beverages 
and tobacco   -8.6  10.1  23.9  -3.1  5.4  -0.3  -55.0  22.2  -6.8  0.9  7.8  -3.3  8.6  -3.9
Textiles, clothing 
and  footwear    10.8  -0.6 1.7 0.4 0.6  2.2 -3.8  2.2  76.2  -15.1  34.7  -11.1 9.7  -1.4
Not elsewhere specified 
products  (n.e.s.)  18.3  -8.0  8.8 -2.3 24.6  -0.9 11.2 8.6 36.9 -3.0  13.4 -7.3 34.0  -1.7
A number of additional insights can be gained 
from the specialisation indices after intermediate 
imports have been netted out of exports (see 
Table 7).42 First, the euro area is confirmed to be 
highly specialised in its traditional stronghold 
medium-high-tech sectors, despite increasingly 
42  In some sectors (in particular, electronics and communications 
equipment, chemicals and basic metals, and fabricated metals 
products), the above-mentioned caveat that intermediate 
imports may go into the exports of other sectors seems to 
apply strongly, as intermediate imports were very high in 
relation to exports. This is reflected in negative or flat revealed 
comparative advantage indicators for almost all of the countries 
shown.  40
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sourcing intermediate imports from abroad. An 
important point is, however, that the revealed 
comparative advantage in motor vehicles, railroad 
and transport equipment has barely changed over 
time. This suggests that an increase in intermediate 
imports in this sector appears to have led to 
part of the previously found rise in export 
specialisation. The fall in the specialisation in 
machinery and equipment for the euro area over 
recent years is confirmed by this indicator. 
Second, this indicator also shows that, among the 
high-tech sectors, the euro area specialises in 
pharmaceuticals and in medical, precision and 
optical instruments, although not in aircraft 
and spacecraft.43 However, on the basis of 
this measure, and contrary to the findings in 
Section 2, the euro area has not increased its 
specialisation in office, accounting and computing 
machinery in recent years when intermediate 
imports are considered (which is more in line 
with the weaker productivity growth in these 
sectors compared with some of the other 
developed economies). This could, however, 
suggest an effective use of intermediate goods 
sourcing from abroad in order to maintain export 
market shares. 
The comparison between the net exports and 
exports only-based indicators also offers 
additional insights for other developed 
economies. In particular, when exports are 
netted out the United States and the United 
Kingdom show a stronger revealed comparative 
advantage in some of the medium-tech industries 
(e.g. motor vehicles, railroad and transport 
equipment and other machinery and equipment) 
and, for the United States, in pharmaceuticals, 
due to a lower share of intermediate imports in 
these compared with other industries.  
In sum, international production sharing is an 
important feature of today’s trade structures 
and should not be neglected when analysing 
trade specialisation structures across countries. 
A number of differences from the previous 
(export only-based) assessment of revealed 
comparative advantage are worth mentioning: 
(i) for the United States, a higher specialisation 
in predominantly research-intensive products 
and (ii) for the euro area, a less pronounced 
specialisation in aircraft and spacecraft, as well 
as a smaller increase in the specialisation in 
office, accounting and computing machinery 
and motor vehicles. The caveats given in 
previous sections also apply here. 
3.5 INTERMEDIATE  IMPORTS  AND  VALUE  ADDED 
An important question when analysing the 
relocation of previously domestic production to 
low-cost countries is whether this leads to an 
increase in domestic value added as resources 
are used more efficiently. To investigate this, 
we relate changes in sectoral value added shares 
to changes in sectors’ shares in intermediate 
imports from developing countries.  
Chart 21 shows the results: there is evidence 
of a positive correlation between changes 
in the sectoral shares in value added and 
in intermediate imports from developing 
countries.44 This tentatively suggests that those 
industries which have increased their share of 
imports of intermediate goods from developing 
countries are likely to have an increasing share 
of total value added in the euro area.
In particular, this is the case for the machinery 
and equipment, vehicles and transport 
equipment and electronics and communications 
equipment industries. While of course simple 
correlations cannot lead to conclusions about 
causality, this result is at least consistent with 
the idea that increasing sourcing of production 
inputs from low-cost countries can have 
beneficial effects in terms of overall value 
added.
43  The lack of specialisation in aircraft and spacecraft on the basis 
of this indicator is due to a large share of intermediate imports 
from other industrialised economies. If only the intermediate 
imports of low-cost countries are considered (which was done 
as a robustness check), the euro area’s specialisation in this 
sector remains. 
44  This result also holds when changes in total intermediate imports 
are used rather than in intermediate imports from developing 
countries.41
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4 CONCLUSIONS
Chart 21 Sectoral value added shares and 
intermediate imports from developing 
countries
(percentage point changes in shares, in current prices, 
between 1994-98 and 1999-20041))
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This paper has aimed to improve our 
understanding of the impact that globalisation 
is having on trade patterns across countries and 
to examine the direction in which euro area 
trade is moving, in comparison with notional 
definitions of comparative advantage as well as 
with respect to other developed economies.  
Trade theory suggests that globalisation and the 
closer integration of emerging markets into the 
world economy can have a large impact on the 
pattern of global trade, which is reflected both 
in falling export market shares for the developed 
economies over and above relative export price 
developments and in increasing import 
penetration. Trade relationships between 
developed and emerging countries are becoming 
ever more important and complex in terms of 
the range and variety of goods traded. A further 
complication originates from the increase in 
fragmentation of production across countries 
due to cost and efficiency considerations. This 
means that, increasingly, existing trade models 
– taken in isolation – have a limited ability to 
explain world trade patterns. Indicators of trade 
performance need to be studied with caution, as 
changes in trade patterns might be taking place 
at a level that was until recently considered 
irrelevant or hidden to the researcher.
An important finding of the paper is that some 
low-wage countries are becoming important 
export competitors for the euro area not only in 
the field of low-tech and labour-intensive 
industries – as largely expected on the basis of 
traditional trade theories – but increasingly also 
for higher-tech and capital-intensive goods, by 
rapidly climbing the technology ladder.  
As for the euro area, substantial trade adjustments 
have been taking place in recent years. These are 
a response to increased competitive pressures 
determined either by technological change, by 
increasing globalisation or by their interaction.   
In particular, (i) the export specialisation of 
the euro area is increasing in some medium-
high or high-tech sectors where productivity 
growth is strong and demand robust, such as 
pharmaceuticals, while declining in lower-tech 
sectors such as textiles; and (ii) the euro area 
appears to be increasingly importing goods from 
low-cost countries. Since a large share of these 
imports are intermediates, the increased import 
penetration is likely to be motivated by cost-
savings and is perhaps aimed at helping euro 
area producers to focus on the higher value-
added stages of the production chain. 
Nevertheless, there are also signs that further 
adjustments may take place. The first is that the 
export sector of the euro area is, in relative 
terms, more specialised in labour-intensive 
goods than the other three developed economies 
considered. This has hardly changed over time, 
even when labour-intensive intermediate 
imports are considered. This could partly reflect 
a specialisation in higher-quality labour-
intensive products, but may well also be a sign 
of more regulated product and labour markets, 
especially compared with the United Kingdom 
and the United States. In comparison with the 
euro area, the United States appears to be 
moving more decisively towards research-
intensive products, while retreating from 
labour-intensive and raw-materials intensive 
sectors. Second, there is evidence that the euro 
area is losing ground in one of its traditionally 
strong sectors – machinery and equipment – 
since higher intermediate imports are associated 42
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with stagnant exports, which could be a sign 
of deindustrialisation in this field. This is 
corroborated by the strong rise in imports of 
capital goods (particularly machinery and 
transport equipment) from the new EU Member 
States, which appears to be partly displacing 
intra-euro area imports.  
Against this background, there appears to be a 
need for a continuation of structural reforms of 
euro area product and labour markets. These 
should be aimed at removing rigidities and 
enhancing flexibility while fostering R&D 
spending, which remains low by international 
standards. 43
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ANNEXES
ANNEX A: DATA CLASSIFICATIONS
Table A1 Definition of country groups
Country/region Countries  included
euro area   12 euro area member countries excluding Slovenia; data for the euro area exclude intra-euro area trade
 flows
United Kingdom  United Kingdom
United States  United States
Japan Japan
China China
Other emerging Asia  India, Indonesia, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand
CEECs  The Commonwealth of Independent States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
  Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan), Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia,
  Former Yugoslavia (now Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Slovenia),
  Albania, Bulgaria, Former Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary, Poland,
 Romania,  Turkey.
ANNEXES
Table A2 Product classification by technological intensity
High-technology industries  Aircraft and spacecraft 
 Pharmaceuticals 
  Office, accounting and computing machinery 
  Electronics and communications equipment 
  Medical, precision and optical instruments 
Medium-high-technology industries  Electrical machinery and apparatus not elsewhere specified (n.e.s.) 
  Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, railroad and transport equipment n.e.s. 
  Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals 
  Machinery and equipment n.e.s. 
Medium-low-technology industries  Building and repairing of ships and boats 
  Rubber and plastic products 
  Other non-metallic mineral products (including mining and quarrying)
  Basic metals and fabricated metal products (including mining and quarrying)
Low-technology industries  Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
  Agriculture, fishing and food products, beverages and tobacco 
  Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
  Not elsewhere specified products (n.e.s.)
Source: Based on the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2005, pp. 181-344
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Table A3 Product classification by factor intensity 
Predominantly raw-materials-intensive  Predominantly capital-intensive
Fertilisers Iron,  steel
Iron ores  Tubes
Non-ferrous ores  Non-ferrous metals
Unprocessed minerals n.e.s.  Vehicle components
Coals Cars  and  cycles
Crude oil  Commercial vehicles
Natural gas  Paints
Coke Toiletries
Refined petroleum products  Rubber articles (including tyres)
Cereals Electricity
Other edible agricultural products  Beverages
Non-edible agricultural products  Manufactured tobaccos
Cereal products 
Fats  Predominantly research-intensive
Meat Consumer  electronics
Preserved meat/fish  Telecommunications equipment
Preserved fruits  Computer equipment
Sugar  Basic inorganic chemicals
Animal food  Basic organic chemicals
 Pharmaceuticals
Predominantly labour-intensive Plastic  articles
Cement Engines
Ceramics Agricultural  equipment
Glass Machine  tools
Yarns, fabrics  Construction equipment
Clothing Specialized  machines
Knitwear Precision  instruments
Carpets Clockmaking
Leather Optics
Wood articles  Electronic components
Furniture Domestic  electrical  appliances
Paper Electrical  equipment
Printing Electrical  apparatus
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  Ships
Metallic structures  Aeronautics
Miscellaneous hardware 
Arms  Not classified
Plastics Non-monetary  gold
Jewellery, works of art  Products n.e.s.
Source: Based on Yilmaz (2003), slightly modified by authors.45
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ANNEXES
Table Most common sources of sectoral measures of international sourcing
ANNEX B: DEFINITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SOURCING 
Customs statistics   Information based on customs arrangements in which tariff exemptions or reductions are granted in 
accordance to the domestic input content of imported goods.
Coverage   Narrow measure
Main advantages   Trace very closely the geographical source of the input content
Main disadvantages   Do not cover processing abroad and direct exports to third countries
International comparability   Scarce
and consistency across time
Best use   To understand the determinants of outsourcing
Examples of datasets   US Offshore Assembly Programme and the EU Outward Processing Trade
Example of studies that use   Görg (2000), Egger and Egger (2001) and Feenstra et al. (2000)
this measure
Input-Output tables   Statistics providing import penetration measures for given sectors, from information on supplier-
buyer relationships across industries, based on survey data
Coverage   Broader measure, including offshore outsourcing and arm’s lenght trade in intermediate inputs
Main advantages   Covers all economic activities, including services, and allows for linkages across sectors
Main disadvantages   Does not cover export substitution. Furthermore, outsourcing indices based on I-O tables are not 
able to identify appropriate measures of import penetration (as these latter include finished goods 
and further assume that the share of imports in the intermediate inputs purchased from sector j by all 
other industries is identical across countries, which seems unlikely to be the case).
International comparability   Difficult international comparability, irregular and untimely but consistent across time
and consistency across time
Best use   For monitoring developments and changes in the production linkages across sectors
Examples of datasets   Eurostat and OECD Input-Output tables
Example of studies that   Wixted et al. (2006) and Hummels et al. (2001)
use this measure)
International trade   Measures focusing specifically on relevant trade shares in various categories of goods imported
statistics   (exported) at different stages of production (or with different carachteristics identifiable with trade 
classifications) by a specific country or group of countries from(to) specific trading partners and 
regions.
Coverage   Narrow measure
Main advantages   Timely information, permitting the identification of specific bilateral trading partner relationships 
and analysis of the evolution across time
Main disadvantages   The measures relate only to trade in goods, and also omit five particular types of outsourcing: 
assembly activities; imports of final goods used in domestic production; imports of final goods that 
are sold under the brand-name of a domestic firm; imports of final goods that could potentially be 
produced domestically but are not; and imports of goods that could potentially be produced 
domestically for export purposes, but are produced abroad and exported to third markets
International comparability  Very good 
and consistency across time
Best use   Useful basis for monitoring the direction and composition of relevant trade flows consistently over 
time and across countries
Examples of datasets   Comext, Comtrade at finest sectoral breakdown (and derived datasets, eg. CHELEM, BACI)
Example of studies that   Yii (1999)
use this measure
Data on transnational   These data provide information on the distribution of employees and production by country as well
enterprises   as where different industries are located
Coverage   Narrow measure
Main advantages   Information about intra-firm distribution of employees and production
Main disadvantages   Very uneven coverage across time and countries46
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Table Most common sectoral measures of international sourcing (cont’d)
International comparability   Easy but incomplete international comparability. Untimely information but fair consistency across
and consistency across time  time
Best use   Monitoring the distribution of employees and production between mother company and affiliates
Examples of datasets   UNCTAD FDI Datasets, AFA and FATS statistics and national national sources
Example of studies that use   Criscuolo (2005)
this measure
Other sources: press-  Useful to gather focused information on relocation, on the direct effects on unemployment and on
reviews, layoff statistics   the indirect effects on labour productivity while sample surveys also give a good insight into the
and sample surveys  motives behind and consequences of such activities47
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ANNEXES
ANNEX C: DEFINITION OF THE LAFAY INDEX
For a given country, i, and for any given product, 




































































where x  i
j and m  i
j are, respectively, exports and 
imports of product j of country i to/from the 
rest of the world, and N is the number of goods 
or sectors.  
According to the index, the comparative 
advantage of country i in the production of item 
j is measured by the deviation of the product j 
normalised trade balance from the overall 
normalised trade balance. The normalisation 
of each sector is obtained by weighting each 
product’s contribution by its importance in 
trade, i.e. the share of product j (imports plus 
exports) in total trade.
Given that the index measures each product’s 
contribution to the overall normalised trade 
balance, the sum of the Lafay index over 
all sectors or products for each country is 
zero. Positive values of the Lafay index 
thus indicate the existence of a comparative 
advantage; the larger the value, the higher the 
degree of specialisation. Similarly, negative 
values indicate no specialisation in a given 
sector or product. 48
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